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NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs commenced this action to compel defendants to sell
approximately 142 acres of ground in North Utah County, or in the
alternative for damages.

Defendants counterclaimed for damages

caused by plaintiffs clouding the title to the land and for their
attorney's fees.

After the trial had commenced, plaintiffs

withdrew their cause of action for specific performance and
proceeded only on their claim for

damages~

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried without a jury before the Honorable Don V.
Tibbs, who entered judgment in favor of plaintiffs and against the
defendants for the sum of

$35,000

together with 8 percent interest
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Defendants' counterclaim had been dismissed during the time of
trial and prior to the time any evidence was put on concerning
said counterclaim.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants seek to have the Supreme Court rule that
plaintiffs had forfeited the $35,000 earnest money which they had
paid; and to have the case remanded so that defendants may put on
evidence concerning their damages.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiffs in this matter are experienced land developers
and had on November 15 and 16, 1979, entered into two earnest
money agreements for the purchase of 105 acres and 37.75 acres
respectively from Cedar Hills Development Company later known as
Cedar Hills Investment and Land Company.

Cedar Hills Investment

and Land Company is a partnership consisting of Associated
Industrial Developers, a California corporation, and Near East
Technological Services, Limited, a California corporation.
The total sum of $35,000 was paid at the time

o~

the

execution of the two earnest money agreements, which amount was
subsequently released by the real estate agent to the sellers in
exchange for a letter of indemnification.

On approximately

February 6, 1978 some two and one-half months after the execution
of the earnest money agreements, an amendment agreement was
entered into between the parties which modified the earnest money
agreements.
According to the terms of the earnest money agreements, the
two sales were contingent upon annexation of the property into the
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Town of Cedar Hills and obtaining approval of a preliminary plat.
Both of these conditions had been accomplished by January 4, 1978.
The earnest money agreements further provided that a total
payment of $215,000 would be made within 30 days of the date when
preliminary plat approval was given and annexation had occurred,
which according to the January 4 date, would make said payment due
on February 3, 1978.

This payment was never made or tendered by

the purchasers.
The earnest money agreements had two provisions for
forfeiture of the plaintiffs' rights in the event of non-payment.
On line 39 and 40, the usual provision whereby the seller could
retain all amounts paid as earnest money as liquidated damages,
and also typed in after line 52 on the earnest money agreements
was a provision that buyers would forfeit all of their interest if
the $215,000 payment was not made within the 30-day period (by
February 3, 1978).
By reason of the fact that the plaintiffs were in default as
per the provisions of the earnest money agreements and subject to
lose their rights to purchase the property as well as their earnest
money, a meeting was scheduled at the office of William Malis in
South Pasadena, California between the real estate agents and the
sellers.

At that meeting, which was held February 6, 1978, the

amendment to the earnest money agreements was prepared and was
signed by William Malis on behalf of Cedar Hills Development
Company.

The amendment agreement was then brought back to Utah

where it was reviewed by the plaintiffs and after discussing the
matter with the real estate agents, it was signed by both Mr.
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Carson and Mr. Bastian.
The amendment agreement made several changes in the original
earnest money agreements, most of which are insignificant as it
relates to this lawsuit.

However, of importance is the fact that

paragraph 2(a) states as follows:
"Buyer agrees as follows: All conditions mentioned in the
earnest money receipts and offer to purchase mentioned above
obligating buyers first payment therein, are hereby deemed
satisfied as of January 4, 1978."
The amendment agreement further provided for the payment of
the sum of $215,000 to be made at the time of the signing of the
agreement.

However, the parties agreed that this payment was to

be made at a closing which was verbally agreed to and which was
scheduled for February 17, 1978 at the office of Rocky Mountain
Title Company in Orem, Utah.
George Drivas, agent for defendants came from California to
attend the closing, however, the plaintiffs never tendered any
funds at that time and the closing never was effected.

There was

much discussion at that time concerning the number of sewer
hookups and culinary water connections that were available for the
development of the property.
In anticipation of the closing, the title company had drawn
the documents, including an escrow agreement (Exhibit 36) and the
uniform real estate contract (Exhibit 35).

Further, the closing

statements themselves were penciled in, including the pro ration
of taxes, etc.

It is undisputed by the parties that the reason

the closing failed was because of the question of the number of
sewer hookups in the development of the property.

There was no
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discussion at the time of closing as to the condition of the title
of the property nor the ability of the defendants to convey the
property, if, in fact, the closing had taken place.
On March 3, 1978, defendants, through their attorney, gave
written notice to plaintiffs' attorney that the sellers were
electing the option in the earnest money agreement to retain the
earnest money sums that had been paid.
plaintiffs filed the lawsuit.

On March 27, 1978,

Paragraph 8 of the Complaint

purported to be a tender on the part of the plaintiffs of the
amounts due on the earnest money agreements.

In response to that

tender, defendants, through their attorney, made a formal request
that a sum certain be tendered in the form of a cashier's check
(Exhibit 23).

No response was ever received from the plaintiffs

or their attorney to that letter.
Thereafter, on

May~3,

1978, Mr. Carson had arranged, subject

to certain conditions, to obtain a loan that would allow him to
proceed and close the transaction (Exhibit 34).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN HOLDING THAT THE
PLAINTIFFS WERE NOT READY, WILLING AND ABLE TO COMPLETE THE
TRANSACTION AS PROVIDED FOR IN THE AGREEMENTS.
Plaintiff claims error by reason of the trial court's finding
that plaintiffs were not ready, willing and able to perform under
the contracts, (Exhibit 9, 10, and 14).

In the context of a

contract to purchase real property, this amounts to a question of
whether or not the parties performed, or tendered their performance
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as required by the contract to purchase.

It is plaintiffs'

contention that performance or tendered performance, (specifically
tender of payment) was not necessary as a result of the trial
court's finding No. 6 where it was held that:
"Defendant was not in a position to deliver the necessary
titles to plaintiff." (R. 108).
Plaintiff offers this finding as justification or as a legal
excuse for its failure to perform or tender its performance.
While in particular cases such a legal excuse does exist, which
relieves a purchaser of his duty to perform or tender performance,
this court has been very clear in outlining the circumstances
necessary for application of this exception to the general rules
governing tender and performance.
The general rule is stated in 86 CJS, Tender, Section 3:
"Where the existence of a right in one claiming it is
dependent on the performance of duties on his part, as by the
payment of money or its equivalent, tender of performance by
him is necessary to enable him to sue to enforce the right."
This policy was echoed by this court in Marlowe Investment
Corporation, vs. Radmall, 26 Utah 2d 124, 485 P.2d 1402 (1971):
"Ordinarily, such a vendor does not necessarily have to have
marketable title until the purchaser has made his payments."
( 1404).
In other words, the vendor's performance wasn't required, and
as a result, there could be no vendor default until the purchaser
had first performed or tendered performance.
Plaintiff suggests that this general rule is not applicable
in the case at bar because the trial court held that defendant did
not have the "necessary titles" ready for delivery to the
plaintiff.

This exception was applied by the court in
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American Savings and Loan Association vs. Blomquist, 24 Utah 2d
35, 465 P.2d 383 (1970), where the court reviewed circumstances
similar to those in the present controversy:
"The position of Blomquist is that as vendors they were not
required to have marketable title all during the pendancy of
the contract, but only when the final payment was made or
tendered; and that sellers could not claim breach of the
contract until they had made or tendered all payments
thereon. They argue that even though the property was under
foreclosure, they had the possibility of making good title
until the end of the redemption period, and that they
therefore, were entitled to have the purchasers continue ~he
payments. We do not disagree with the arguments nor with the
cases cited in appropriate circumstances. But where it is
shown that there is no possibility that the vendor will be
ever able to convey good title, the purchaser of the property
is not required to continue on the useless course of paying
up in full and making demand for an obviously impossible
performance. Whether this is the fact is something for the
trial court to determine." (p. 37).
The court makes it very clear that the exception to the
general rule that tender of performance or performance is required
is to be applied when the vendor's performance obviously becomes
impossible, and where there is no possibility of his ever being
able to perform.

In the case at bar, no evidence was produced from

any source that defendants' performance under the contracts was
impossible, or that there was no possibility of ever being able to
perform.

To the contrary, Mr. Church, the title company officer

who prepared the title reports and closing documents, testified
that the encumbrances on title could be resolved:
"Q: (By Mr. Wilson) Is there any reason that you are aware
of as to why this transaction could not continue to have been
closed in a matter of a day or two?
A: (By Mr. Church) I think any of them [title questions]
could have been resolved or accomplished." (R. 521, lines 19
to 23.)
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Mr. Church's testimony was corroborated by the testimony of
Reed Nixon, an agent of the defendant as follows:
"Q:
A:

(By Mr. Wilson)
(By Mr. Nixon)

Could the matter have been closed?
Yes.

Q: Now, when you say yes, will you tell us the time frame of
what it would have taken to have closed it?
A: Yes, what it would have taken was to have the money
tendered by the buyers so that these obligations, which is
the normal thing at closing, to the title company and
escrowed and then the obligations are paid off and then the
underlying contracts and then, of course, the documents that
were to be signed at that time could all be properly
recorded.
And were you as the agent and person who made the
conveyance, or at least, could have made the conveyance, were
you capable of conveying the 16 acres that were to be
released?

Q:

A:

Yes."

There was no evidence presented at trial which would suggest
that the defendants could not perform.

The above referred to

testimony presents a contrary conclusion, that it was definitely
possible that the vendor could provide title to the 16 acres which
was to be released.

Plaintiffs have presented no evidence and the

trial court did not hold that defendants could never perform or
that such performance by defendants was impossible and as a
result, the exception to the general rule· that tender is required
should not be applied in this case.

The application of this legal

excuse or justification for failure to perform or tender
performance is very limited.

According to the weight of

authority:
"For encumbrances to serve as an excuse for failure of
demand, tender or performance, there must be a natural
inability on the part of the vendor to perform, and it is not
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sufficient that at the time of performance there is an
encumbrance on the property if the vendor is able to remove
it • • • "(92 CJS Vendor and Purchaser, Section 580g).
This factual circumstance falls squarely within the above
delineated rule, and defendant urges the court to reject
plaintiffs' contention that it was excused from having to abide
the technicality of tender (plaintiffs' brief, page 37).
Plaintiffs make a second argument for the proposition that it
was not required to perform or tender performance, and bases that
position on the decision of this court in Huck vs. Hayes, 560 P.2d
1124 (1977).

It is important to make several key distinctions

between the Huck factual background and that of the present case.
First, the nature of the action itself.

In Huck the plaintiff was

suing for specific performance whereas the plaintiff in the
instant case chose to withdraw his cause for specific performance
and preceeded on damages alone.

In the present case, there has

never been a bona fide tender of performance; whereas in Huck, the
plaintiff delivered to the realtor conducting the transaction, a
cashier's check for the total amount of the defendants equity in
the property.

Finally, in Huck, the plaintiffs tender of payment

was repeatedly rejected by the defendant, while in the present
case, the defendants have not received a tender even though there
has been a specific request for a tender to be made. (Exhibit 23).
Huck stands for the proposition that where the purchasers had
tendered payment, failure to make a reciprocal performance by the
vendor places him in default.

This ruling is not inconsistent in

the least with the finding of the trial court that plaintiff was
not ready, willing, and able to perform, in deed, that plaintiff
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did not perform nor ever tendered performance.

Clearly, the

factual circumstances which were deemed dispositive in the Huck
case simply are not present in the case at bar, and the court is
urged to uphold the trial court's finding that plaintiff failed to
perform.
A final argument in support of this assignment of error is
ventured by the plaintiff to the effect that if a tender is
required, then the letter (Exhibit 42) to defendant dated February
23, 1978, qualifies under the statutory tender section, 78-27-1,

UCA.

The last paragraph of that letter reads:
"If you are willing to discuss the affording of an easement
for the additional lagoon systems as an alternative to the
existing contracts requiring 42 hookups to your present
lagoon syst~m, subject to the approval of the State Health
Department, we would appreciate hearing directly from you as
we are prepared to close the matter within the next 10 days."
This paragraph fails under the statutory tender rule of UCA

78-27-1 on two separate grounds.

First, there is no "offer in

writing to pay a particular sum of money" as is expressly required
in the Section.

There is nothing more than a bare assertion that

the plaintiffs were prepared to close within 10 days if certain
conditions were met, primarily, relating to the granting of an
easement for sewer lagoons.

Such an "offer" is patently defective

under the statutory tender rule, for that reason alone.

Add to

that the fact that the offer made by the plaintiffs was inherently
defective for reasons other than simply not physically producing
the money, (which the statutory tender rule was formulated to
excuse).
In Hyams vs. Bamberger, 360 P. 202 (1894) the court ruled on
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the proper application of the predecessor statutory tender
section, UCA 78-27-1, (The statutes were identical), saying:
"Where a man makes a tender in writing, the statute excuses
him from actually producing the money at the time of making
tender, but it excuses no other act or requirement on his
part which would be necessary to make a valid tender,
independently of the statute."
When the trial court ruled in finding No. 2 that the
requirement to provide 42 sewer hookups was waived by plaintiff in
the amendment agreement, (Exhibit 14) it undercut the legal
support by which plaintiff could require either the provision of
hookups, or as an alternative, the granting of an easement for the
sewer lagoons, as a condition precedent to tender of payment.
This court in Sieverts vs. White, 2 Utah 2d 351, 273 P.2d 974
(1954) acknowledged the general rule that:
"A tender to be good must be
the tenderer does not have a
plaintiffs here had no right
deed as a condition to their
price • • • "

free from any condition which
right to insist upon. • • the
to insist upon delivery of a
making a tender of purchase

By analogy, in the present controversy, plaintiffs had no
legal right to insist upon either performance, (provision of
hookups or granting of an easement) from defendants, and the
"offer" even though purported to fall under the protection of the
statutory tender provision, fails for reason outside that which
UCA 78-27-1 is intended to excuse.

Once again, the court is urged

to reject this attempt to excuse nonperformance and failure to
tender payment on the part of plaintiffs and to uphold the trial
court's findings in so far as they impose the consequences of the
plaintiffs failure to pay or tender performance to defendant.
POINT II
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THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN NOT AWARDING PLAINTIFF EITHER
DAMAGES OR ATTORNEY'S FEES.
Plaintiffs contend that the trial court committed error in
determining that their claim for damages and attorney's fees was
groundless.

In responding to that argument, the conclusions of

the analysis in the foregoing section on plaintiffs' failure to
perform or tender performance will be referred to.

The general

rule governing breach of contract actions in which the purchaser
is seeking damages is two pronged.

First, it must be abundantly

clear that the seller breached the contract and even more
important, in the analysis at hand, it must be equally clear that
the purchaser is not himself in default.
The focus of plaintiffs' assignment of error to the court is
that the seller did not breach the contract and that plaintiffs
are therefore, not entitled to maintain an action for damages
arising out of a purported breach of the contract.

The finding of

the trial court was that plaintiffs were not ready, willing and
able to perform at the appointed time, and that it made no attempt
to perform or tender performance as required under the earnest
money contracts as modified by the amendment agreement (Exhibits

9, 10, and 14).

The conclusion which follows is that regardless

of defendants' breach or performance under the agreements, the
fact remains that plaintiffs had failed in their obligation under
the documents, and consequently, should be precluded from
maintaining an action for breach of contract with its attendant
claim for damages.
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POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT RULED CORRECTLY THAT THE REQUIREMENT FOR
FURNISHING OF SEWER HOOKUPS WAS WAIVED.
Defendants argue that the trial court's finding No. 2, which
stated that the amendment agreement, (Exhibit 14), was a full and
complete waiver of any requirement that defendants provide sewer
hookups was in error.

Support for this assertion consists only of

subsequent argument by plaintiff that the hookups were necessary
and that it would have been foolish to waive this requirement.
Tpe amendment agreement, which was undated, but according to the
testimony of witnesses, was drafted on or about February 6, 1978,
(R. 663 lines 10-12)

~nd

signed by plaintiffs prior to February

17, 1978, is explicit and clear in its meaning:
"Paragraph No. 2: Buyer agrees as follows:
(a) all
conditions mentioned in the earnest money receipts and offers
to purchase mentioned above obligating buyers' first payment
thereon are hereby deemed satisfied as of January 4, 1978."
It is significant to note that at the time the amendment was
drafted, plaintiffs were already in default under the contract,
having failed to make the prescribed first payment within 30 days
or receiving preliminary plat approval and obtaining annexation,
both of which occurred by January 4, 1978.

In view of the

default, but desiring to accommodate plaintiffs and keep the
transaction alive, defendants agreed to extend the time for
plaintiffs' performance to such time as the amendment was signed.
Four conditions were included in the amendment to which plaintiffs
agreed:
1.

That all conditions precedent to buyers' obligation to
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make its first payment of $175,000 and $40,000 respectively, would
be deemed to be already satisfied as of January 4, 1978.

2.

The initial total payment of $215,000 would be forth

coming at the time the amendment was to be signed by the
plaintiffs.

3.

That the buyers' payment schedule be accelerated

approximately one month in order to coincide with sellers
underlying contractual obligations on the property.

4.

That buyers would execute quit claim deeds to sellers in

order to expedite clearing title should buyers fail to perform
under the contract.
Given this exchange of consideration, all of which the
parties to the amendment agreement bargained for, the terms and
conditions of the amendment became binding on the parties and the
contract became enforceable.
Finding No. 2 is merely· a recognition of this fact and
operates independent of the subsequent changes of heart of either
party.
DATED this

2Cj day of July, 1980.
1

N

Respondents
350
t Center
Provo, Utah 84601
375-9801
~B-ff-l:lQ.3;'11-for
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-15Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

